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The benchmark of this paper is the Fujita and Thisse (2002) core-periphery
model, which adds a R&D sector with skilled labor to create new varieties for the
modern sector. The number of R&D ﬁrms increases not only with the number of
existing patents and knowledge spillovers but also with the number of skilled workers
who can migrate and choose the region oﬀering the better lifetime salary. The main
objective of the present work is to analyse the long-term consequences of the choice of
the migration law in Fujita and Thisse (2002) and in other comparable models. After
describing throughoutly our benchmark, we introduce a diﬀerent migration law ` a la
Krugman (1991). Although the change in the migration law implies that individuals
do not foresee price changes and hence their choice is somehow less optimal, the
steady state outcome does not vary qualitatively: the unique steady state is a
symmetric distribution of labor across regions. Later we change the benchmark
model to avoid the so called monotonic convergence hypothesis, about which we
discuss at large in the paper. When we model the economy using Romer (1990) two
sector model applied to two regions allowing for skilled migration, then there exists a
solution path that converges to a steady state which exhibits a distribution of skilled
workers amongst regions which is no longer symmetric. In eﬀect, the new steady
state depends on technology, ﬁxed costs, knowledge spill-overs and transportation
costs.
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“Increasing returns in production activities are needed if we want to explain economic
agglomerations without appealing to the attributes of physical geography. In particular,
the trade-oﬀ between increasing returns in production and transportation costs is central
to the understanding of the geography of economic activities”,
(p.7, Fujita and Thisse, 2002).
Neoclassical growth models explain the intertemporal evolution of economies leaving aside
the location issue. Almost all the research carried in geographic economics has used
models with productive externalities. On the technical side of the modelling, this choice
multiplies the number of equilibria, introducing the problem of equilibrium selection into
the discussion. What are the forces leading one economy towards an equilibrium rather
than another? What is more relevant in the long-term, initial endowments or self-fulﬁlling
expectations? If it was the initial distribution of wealth, then nothing can prevent a region
poorly endowed from a poverty trap. Among these equilibria, we usually observe total
agglomeration in one region or conﬁgurations in which marginal prices are equated across
space.
In economies with Marshalian externalities, productive factors move towards those activ-
ities yielding initially the largest marginal returns. In this sense, history matters, deter-
mines the economy dynamics and its long-run outcome. Expectations do not play a major
role since in this environment, decisions are made according to current returns. Never-
theless, the role of expectations is undeniable in other settings where future prospects
aﬀect current decisions. Furthermore, what matters is not only the expectations about
the future value of earnings but also how expectations themselves are formed.
It is sensitive then to ask whether population movements would reinforce or modify the
economic predictions of the Economic Geography models. Migration is a complex phe-
nomenon involving numerous interacting aspects. Individuals leave their cities, their cul-
ture, language, family, habits and experience. There are also costs associated to moving,
searching for a job and a house. Some would argue that there exist assimilation costs for
the host region when origin and destination are culturally afar. Nevertheless inter-regional
movements do not necessarily imply a cultural diﬀerence or a language change. Probably
for this reason, movements across regions outsize international ones.
Given the importance of migrations in an increasingly interdependent world where cap-
1ital is freely mobile, a number of authors have proposed economic models with labor
movements. Many of these models are developed within a partial equilibrium framework,
where the dynamic consequences of migrations on the regional economy at origin and
destination cannot be studied. These models are frequently static, losing consequently
the power to analyze the short and medium term consequences of migrations. Few models
encompass migrations and their eﬀects on the whole economy in both the short and the
long term.
We believe that the modelling of inter-regional migrations needs a more comprehensive
appraisal within a general equilibrium dynamic model. We describe three models where
migrations are introduced in such framework. In section 3 we reproduce in detail the
model in Fujita and Thisse (2002). The authors propose a general equilibrium model
to study the links between agglomeration and growth in a two regions framework with
monopolistic competition. Only skilled workers are allowed to migrate. Economic growth
is driven by R&D which is itself developed by skilled workers’ knowledge. There is an
externality in the production of patents or ideas, which is translated into researchers’
salaries. This in turn leads to a medium-term agglomeration of the R&D activity in one
region.
The counterpart of increased salaries are costs: migrants pay a cost which is a congestion
cost following Musa (1978). This cost is a loss in utility which depends on the rate of
migration inasmuch as a migrant imposes a negative externality on the others. The more
people change region, the larger it is. This modeling of costs smoothes the dynamics of
migrations and it avoids bang-bang solutions. They are related to regional price indexes
reﬂecting the loss in utility due to diﬀerences in life-costs. Consequently, the assumption
of perfect foresighted agents implies that future regional wages and prices must be known
before taking the migration decision. The migration law depends on future regional wages
and prices. A classical dynamic analysis is not possible in this framework. To cope with
this restriction, the authors introduce the monotonic convergence hypothesis. From all
possible expectations for perfect-foresighted agents, they pick the one that yields mono-
tonic convergence from the initial condition to the long-run solution. More speciﬁcally,
they ﬁx the initial and ﬁnal distributions of skilled workers across regions.
We provide detailed comments on some aspects of this model at the end of the section.
We propose in section 4 a simpliﬁcation of the model. We replace the original migration
law by that of Krugman (1991). The main diﬀerence with the previous migration law is
that agents do not take into account how life-costs are modiﬁed with population changes
2through goods demand, individuals are less-perfect foresighted. With this simpler migra-
tion law we are able to analyze the dynamic and long-run properties of the model using
standard techniques. The unique steady state is the symmetric distribution of skilled
individuals across regions. However, this long-run outcome is unstable and the solution
path reaches a corner solution, that is agglomeration of skilled individuals in one of the
regions.
Next, in section 5 we present a diﬀerent framework to analyze migrations based on Romer
(1990). Here there is a unique type of individual who is able to work in the two eco-
nomic sectors: manufacturing and R&D. There is an externality in the production of new
patents, namely productivity is boosted by past ideas. As long as salaries are aﬀected by
the number of varieties in the regional economies, workers choose the region with a longer
R&D history. In contrast to Fujita and Thisse, the unique steady state is not symmetric
but a distribution of workers which depends on research ﬁxed costs, on regional technolo-
gies and on transportation costs. It is the regional conﬁguration where marginal prices
and returns are equalized. More importantly, the resulting dynamic system has a stable
manifold. This means that there exists a set of initial conditions along a stable manifold
such that the solution path reaches its steady state. We present our conclusions in the
ﬁnal section of the paper.
2 Related literature
As mentioned before, this paper stems from the work of Fujita and Thisse (2002). This is
a complete and complex model in which skilled individuals are allowed to migrate. The
symmetric distribution of individuals is the unique steady state of the model, although the
only two long-run stable conﬁgurations are the corner solutions, that is total agglomeration
of skilled individuals in one region.
Krugman (1991) and its sequel by Fukao and Benabou (1993) model inter-sectorial labor
movements rather than inter-regional, but their migration law can be adapted to the
latter. They assume that agents are somehow myopic, since when taking their migration
decision they do not account for the consequences of this decision on regional prices. The
unique steady state is unstable. The solution path diverges from its steady state value
towards one of the corner solutions forming spirals or monotonically depending on the
parameter set and the initial conditions.
3Mossay (2001) studies the role of expectation formation in convergence speed. He explores
the same two country model with perfect foresighted and myopic agents. If the countries
diﬀer largely in their initial endowments, then rational adjustments can lead the economies
to converge faster to their long-run conﬁguration than with myopic adjustments.
In the three models studied in this paper, we only allow skilled workers to migrate. As
stated by empirical research the propensity to migrate increases with education. Our
assumption is then a simpliﬁcation of reality that focus on the most sizeable movement.
According to Greenwood (1997) migration rises with education. He shows using data for
US ﬂows between 1980 and 1985, that migration propensities are highest for the group
of individuals between 25 and 29 years old. For all age classes, migration propensity
increases with education. For the group from 25 to 29 years old with ﬁve or more years of
college, it is 4.6 times as high as for individuals with 0 to 8 years of elementary school (and
2 times as high for the 45 to 64 years old group). For Canada similar results are shown by
Ledent (1990). Antolin and Bover (1997) study inter-regional migration in Spain using
data from the Spanish Migration Survey, from 1987 to 1991. Their results are in line with
Greenwood’s. After controlling for marital status, the number of children, being head
of family, regional unemployment rates, etc. they ﬁnd that “higher education increases
the probability of migration and people with primary education are the less prone to
migrate...” (p. 221, Antolin and Bover, 1997). Gianetti (2001) studies the links between
migration and education in Italy. She also ﬁnds a positive relationship between education
and migration. Besides, the percentage of skilled individuals that have completed college
or high-school in a region represents a pull factor for skilled individuals in other regions.
A piece of research close to ours is provided by Gianetti (2003). She introduces migrations
in a general equilibrium growth model. Individuals’ skills are complementary ` a la Kremer
(1993), which creates a self-selection of migrants. If the skill premium is increasing with
the average human capital, then skilled workers have an incentive to move to the rich
regions. Low skilled workers would leave rich regions to the poor regions to minimize
their living costs. Individuals compare the utility provided by their next period salary in
both regions, taking into account that they must fulﬁll a minimum level for consumption
to cover basic needs. This minimal consumption level is then reduced to housing prices,
that could also have been interpreted as a migration ﬁxed cost. She characterizes the
equilibrium, which can be asymmetric depending on the skill distribution: all skilled
individuals move to the North and all unskilled to the South.
43 A benchmark model for inter-regional migration
In Fujita and Thisse (2002) model (FT hereafter) there are two regions, region 1 and
region 2, and three economic sectors: the traditional good (T) sector, the modern (M)
sector and the R&D sector.
Let LT,j be the number of workers in the T sector, Lj the number of unskilled workers in
the M sector and λj the number of skilled workers in region j. Besides, we assume for
simplicity reasons that population is constant and that LT,1(t)+LT,2(t)+L1(t)+L2(t) = L
and λ1(t) + λ2(t) = 1 for any t ≥ 0. Only skilled individuals are allowed to migrate,
therefore LT,1(t) + L1(t) = L/2 and LT,2(t) + L2(t) = L/2, ∀t.
The population is formed by inﬁnite lived dynasties. Agents have the following instanta-
neous utility function
u(T,Q) =
T 1− Q 
(1 −  )1−   , (1)
where T is the amount of traditional good consumed, Q is an index of ﬁnal or manufac-
tured goods deﬁned as Q =






, M is the number of ﬁnal good varieties and qi
is the quantity consumed of ﬁnal good i. If ǫ stands for the individual’s earnings, then
her budget constraint is




The agents’ problem consists in maximizing their instantaneous utility (1) given their
budget constraint (2). Notice that inﬁnite lived dynasties maximize their present con-
sumption not taking into account their future revenue. The ﬁrst order conditions with
respect to T and qi for all i ∈ [0,M] yield the optimal quantities of the traditional and
the modern goods:
T =




piqidi = (1 −  )ǫ, (3)
and
qi(t) =  ǫpi(t)
−σP
σ−1, (4)
where σ is deﬁned as σ ≡
1
1−ρ and P(t) =




is the price index of the
M varieties. Since 0 < ρ < 1, we obtain that 1 < σ < ∞. Substituting (3) and (4) into (1),
we can compute the indirect utility of an agent living in region r vr (ǫr(t)) = ǫr(t)Pr(t)− ,
where Pr is the price index in region r. The lifetime utility of an individual is deﬁned by
U(0) = V (0) − Σhe
−γthCm(th), (5)
5with γ the subjective discount rate common to all individuals, th the moment when the
hth migration takes place and Cm moving costs associated to migration. Notice that
migration costs depend on the time the migration takes place. The lifetime utility gross






There is a global and perfectly competitive market, where bonds are traded bearing an
interest rate ν(t) at time t. This interest rate is common to the two regions. We denote
by ¯ v(t,0) = 1
t
  t
0 v(τ)dτ the average interest rate in period [0,t]. If wr(t) stands for the










−¯ ν(t,0)tdt = aH + W(0), (6)
being aH the value of the consumer’s initial assets. Maximizing the individual’s lifetime
utility in (5) subject to her intertemporal budget constraint (6) we obtain that
˙ ǫ(t)
ǫ(t) =
ν(t) − γ, which implies that the dynamics of regional expenditure E are
˙ E(t)
E(t) = ν(t) − γ.
There exists a traditional good produced with constant returns to scale, T. Only unskilled
labor is used in its production and their salary equals their marginal productivity, that is
wT(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0. As a consequence, the total production of the traditional good is
LT(t).
Let us assume that once a M ﬁrm buys from the R&D sector the patent to produce a new
ﬁnal good, it produces it with constant returns to scale. In region j there are Mj ﬁnal
good ﬁrms, each one producing a diﬀerent good. We shall drop for the moment being
regional indexes for the sake of simplicity.
The ﬁrm producing good i employs li unskilled workers. Hence Lj(t) =
  Mj(t)
0 li(t)di
deﬁnes total labor in the ﬁnal good sector in region j, for j = 1,2. Production of ﬁrm j
is Yj(t) = lj(t) so that wj(t) = 1. Thus, unskilled workers receive a unit salary in both
regions and sectors.
Demand for ﬁnal good i produced in region 1 is:
Qi(t) =  E1(t)pi(t)
−σP
σ−1





6and Υ > 1 stands for transportation costs of the iceberg type. Transportation costs
account for the amount of good that “melts” in the way.




which yields pi(t) =
1








for r,s ∈ {1,2}, r  = s. Firms’ proﬁts are given by πr =
Qr
σ−1. Substituting (8) into (7):









with s,r ∈ {1,2} with r  = s.
R&D productivity increases with the existing capital of past ideas and methods, and this
capital is seen as a public good1. New ideas in region j, nj are produced according to
nj = Kjλj, (10)
where Kj is knowledge capital in region j and λj skilled workers in region j. Besides,
there are some knowledge spillovers between researchers in both regions, measured by the
parameter η. Denoting by h individual’s human capital, Kj is deﬁned as
Kj =











If we further assume that individual human capital equals the total number of patents
h = M, then
Kr = Mk (λ + η(1 − λ)), (11)
where k( ) is a strictly convex and increasing function, which veriﬁes that k(0) = 0 and
k(1) = 1. Patents growth is then ˙ M = n1 + n2. Replacing (10) and (11) into the later
expression for ˙ M
˙ M = M (λk(λ + η(1 − λ)) + (1 − λ)k(1 − λ + ηλ)) = Mg(λ). (12)
1Time indexes are not shown for the ease of exposition.
7Consequently, g(λ) = λk(λ + η(1 − λ)) + (1 − λ)k(1 − λ + ηλ) is the patent production
growth rate. Let us denote by k1(λ) = k (λ + η(1 − λ)) and k2(λ) = k (1 − λ + ηλ).
The cost of a new invention in region r is wr/Mkr(λ), where Mkr(λ) measures the average
productivity of a researcher in region r. Proﬁts in the R&D sector, Πj, equal beneﬁts







At equilibrium costs in the R&D sector equal its beneﬁts, equating these quantities we
obtain that salaries in the sector are wr = ΠjMkr(λ). If ﬁnal good ﬁrms are footloose,
then proﬁts are equal for all ﬁrms. Since at equilibrium ﬁrm’s proﬁts are πj = Qj/(1−σ),
Qi = Qj for any i and j.
3.1 Migration behavior
The counterpart of enjoying larger lifetime earnings are migration costs which depend on





In order to construct the migration law and due to the perfect foresight hypothesis, the
monotonic convergence hypothesis (mc-hypothesis hereafter) is introduced:
Deﬁnition 1 [Monotonic Convergence Hypothesis]
Let ˜ λ ∈ [0,1] and λ0 ∈ [0,1] such that ˜ λ  = λ0. If {λ(t)}∞
t=0 is an equilibrium path satisfying
the initial condition λ(0) = λ0, this path satisﬁes the monotonic convergence hypothesis
under ˜ λ when 0 ≤ T ≤ ∞ exists such that
when λ0 < ˜ λ ˙ λ(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0,T),
λ(t) = ˜ λ for t ≥ T,
when λ0 > ˜ λ ˙ λ(t) < 0 for t ∈ (0,T),
λ(t) = ˜ λ for t ≥ T.
Therefore, the mc-hypothesis restricts expectations in trajectories that converge towards a
long-run solution, which is equivalent to restricting equilibrium paths to monotonic paths.
In other words, individuals migrate only once. Notice that through the mc-hypothesis
8not only the authors focus on perfect foresighted expectations, but they pick a very
speciﬁc type of expectation function. Hence, there is no room for stochastic behaviors,
coordination failures, etc.











and using (5) and (13), her lifetime utility is




that is migratio cost is a loss in utility which depends on the migration rate. In eﬀect,
each migrant imposes a negative externality on the others. At equilibrium migrants are
indiﬀerent about their migration time, that is U(0;t) = U(0;T). After some substitutions,






















Total production of traditional good is LT, then the traditional good market clears when
LT = (1 −  )E(t). (15)
Since L1 + L2 is the ﬁnal good sector production:
L1 + L2 =  ρE(t). (16)
Putting together (15) and (16) we obtain that total expenditure is constant:
E =
L
1 −  (1 − ρ)
. (17)













+ λraH (γ + kr(λr)) (18)
for r = 1,2. Besides, (18) is also used to compute regional expenditure when λ is not
ﬁxed.




There are three diﬀerent equilibria depending on the relationship between
E1









φ, then M1 = M and M2 = 0. Otherwise if φ ≥
E1
E2,
M1 = 0 and M2 = M. In the three cases, π∗ =
 E
σM.
When FT study the dynamics of the model, they provide the following deﬁnition of
stability:
Deﬁnition 2 [Stability]
The ss-growth path under ˜ λ is said to be stable if there exists a neighborhood Λ of ˜ λ such
that, for any λ0 ∈ Λ with λ0  = ˜ λ, an equilibrium path exists that satisﬁes the monotonic
convergence hypothesis under ˜ λ. The ss-growth path under ˜ λ is said to be unstable when
there is no such neighborhood of ˜ λ.
Under the mc-hypothesis there are three values of ¯ λ under which the economy is at a
steady state: ¯ λ = 0, ¯ λ = 1/2 and ¯ λ = 1. Agglomeration of skilled workers in a region
yields a stable steady state, whereas the symmetric distribution does not.
As the following proposition puts forward, even when the R&D sector agglomerates, the
ﬁnal good sector can have a diﬀerent distribution.
Proposition 1 [Agglomeration results]
When ﬁrms are completely mobile, then the stable spatial conﬁguration exhibits
i) a dominant agglomeration involving the innovation sector entirely and a large frac-
tion of the modern sector in the same region when
Υ
σ−1 >
σ +  
σ −  
;




σ +  
σ −  
,
Proof: See chapter 11 in Fujita and Thisse (2002).
103.4 Some comments
Krugman’s (1991) article is part of a literature devoted to the study of the roles of history
and self-fulﬁlling expectations in the case of multiple equilibria. As it was put forward
by Matsuyama (1991), in the case of highly non-linear models, there are multiple steady
states due to externalities. Though local analysis can be conducted, a global analysis is
required to rule out other perfect foresight solution paths. In Krugman (1991) history or
self-fulﬁlling expectations determine the long-run solution depending on the parameter
set.
Another example of a model with productive externalities is the previously mentioned by
Matsuyama (1991). We can observe that results are not as simple as in Krugman (1991).
The debate surrounds FT’s model. The externalities present in the R&D sector cause the
multiplicity of steady state solutions and the existence of a set of self-fulﬁlling expectations
leading to either long-run outcome. Furthermore, this assumption also allowed the model
to reach monotonically a long-run solution in ﬁnite time given that population is constant.
We believe that closer attention has to be paid to the dynamics of FT model in two
aspects. First, we focus on the dynamic equations provided for regional expenditure and
total patent production. Individual expenditure depends on the individual’s trajectory as
the equation shows:
ǫj = γ (aH + Wj(0))
where Wj(0) is individual’s j total life-time earnings. Hence, individual expenditure is
conditioned to migration movements. As a consequence regional expenditure at time
t, which is the addition of all expenditure quantities realized by individuals living in
the region at that moment, is a function of the particular migration trajectory of each
individual and of the moment they arrived to the region. This is why regional expenditure











γ(−˙ λ1(s))(aH + W(0,s))I˙ λ1(s)<0ds + λ1(0)γ (aH + W(0)), (19)
and E2(t) = E − E1(t). I˙ λr(s)>0 is the indicator function for r = 1,2 whose value is one
if ˙ λr(s) > 0 and zero otherwise. W(0) stands for lifetime earnings of individuals who do
not move from region 1 and W(T) for lifetime earnings of those who do not leave region
2. The ﬁrst integral term in E1 represents the amount spent by individuals who have
11arrived to region 1 before time t. The second integral term is the amount spent by that
those live in region 1 at time t but who migrate sometime after t. The last term in (19)
is the amount spent at time t by individuals who do not leave region 1.
Regional expenditure appears indirectly in the migration law, and given its deﬁnition in
(19), the agglomeration results in section 3.3 many not hold anylonger. Then, even at
steady state, when λ = ¯ λ, we are not able to compute Er. Consequently, it is almost
impossible to check under which conditions the ratio E1/E2 is larger or smaller than φ or
its inverse, since this ratio varies with time and it depends on the future of variable λ as
well as on its past. Besides, as times evolves the economy could shift from an equilibrium
to another.
We know from equation (12) that the dynamics of M are described by





before λ reaches a constant value. Nevertheless it is true that once the steady state or
any other long-run solution is attained, the dynamics of M are described by ˙ M(t) =
g(¯ λ(t−T))M(T) being T the exact time at which a long-run solution is achieved. Then,

















Finally, we have attempted to solve the dynamics of this problem using standard tech-
niques (see appendix 7 for technical details). If φ <
E1
E2 < 1
φ, we can build a system of
four dynamic equations in four variables {λ,E1,Θ,Λ}. Θ is the second term in (14) and
Λ(t) represents lifetime earnings of someone migrating to region 1 at time t. If λ attains
a constant value, so does E1, and Θ is constant by construction at T. However, Λ grows





φ, then ˙ λ(T) = 0 by construction but λ = 1/2 is no longer a steady state.
124 Modifying the migration law
In this section, we modify FT’s model using the migration law presented by Mussa (1978),
retaken afterwards by Krugman (1991).
4.1 Krugman’s migration law
Mussa (1978) and Krugman (1991) modelled the movement of individuals between sectors
as a ﬂow responding to market incentives. Population changes were described by the
incentive to work in a sector rather than in other. This vision diﬀers from FT in many
respects. First, agents do not compare utilities but the salaries’ value. Second, agents
are “less” perfect foresighted than in FT, i.e. when they decide to migrate they do not
consider the possibility of future migrations nor the eﬀect of their move on the future
of the economy. It is assumed that agents believe that they will only move once. In
Krugman (1991) there exists a region for the parameters and the initial conditions such
that convergence to the steady state is not monotonic but in spirals. This means that
agents actually move more than once.
We shall implement Mussa, Krugman migration law into FT’s model. This amounts to
model migrations as:
˙ λ(t) = β





















and limt→∞ q(t) = 0. Then
˙ λ(t) = βq(t), (21)
˙ q(t) = γq(t) − Π(t)M(t)[k1(λ(t)) − k2(λ(t))], (22)
where q is understood by Krugman as the opportunity cost of investing one unit of labor







13At equilibrium, instantaneous proﬁts are π∗(t) =
 E(t)
σM(t). Then, since total expenditure is















The introduction of Krugman (1991) migration law allows for an easier analysis of the
dynamics of migrations.
Proposition 2 [Steady State]




˙ λ(t) = βq(t),
˙ q(t) = γq(t) − V (t)[k1(λ(t)) − k2(λ(t))],




There exists an interior steady state to the system described by the set {¯ λ = 1/2, ¯ q =




γ+g(1/2)}. The system diverges from its unique interior steady state and it
reaches a corner solution λ = 0 or λ = 1 in ﬁnite time since population is ﬁnite.
Proof: See appendix 8.
Linearizing (23) around the steady state, we obtain the associated eigenvalues: l1 =






2 . Independently of the sign of the radical in
l2,3, the three eigenvalues have a positive real part. Hence convergence to one of the
corner solutions is monotone if γ > 8β(1 − η)k′(
1+η
2 ) and history determines the ﬁnal
outcome. The existence of an overlap depends on γ, η, β and k( ), or in other words,
on the time discount rate, the strength of knowledge spillovers and on externalities in
R&D production. If individuals heavily discount the future, then as in Krugman (1991),
there is no overlap. Similarly, if externalities are not large enough (measured by η, β and
k( )), then individuals’ decisions do not depend on the others. In this aspect, our results
follow the lines in Krugman (1991) and Fukao and Benabou (1993) (for a discussion on
the subject see next subsection).
4.2 Comparing results
A noticeable feature of this model is that results are in line with FT’s. More precisely,
under Krugman’s migration law agents do not take into consideration the regional price
14changes. If these two models predict similar properties for the solution trajectory, it
means that the price change caused by migration plays no signiﬁcant role.
Next, we compare the model results in this section with the original model in Krugman
(1991). In Krugman (1991) there exists a steady state distribution of workers between the
two sectors which depends on salary formation in the sector whose production is aﬀected
by externalities. This steady state is unstable and the solution trajectory reaches in ﬁnite
time a corner solution. Whether one or the other solution is reached depends ﬁrst on the
parameter set. The relevant parameters for stability are r, the interest rate, γ the speed
of adjustment and β the strength of externalities.
If r2 > 4γβ, then the system steadily diverges from the steady state to reach a long-run
solution which is completely determined by history. Otherwise there exists a couple of
complex roots. In the case of complex roots, there exists a range of expectations that
are decisive for the long-run rather than history. Krugman remarks that there exists a
range of initial values for which this is true and he call this range the overlap. If there is
no overlap, then history always decides the long-run outcome. The existence and width
of the overlap depend on r, γ and β. If r is suﬃciently large, then there is no overlap.
If the future is heavily discounted, individuals do not care about others’ future actions
and then it is history that determines the long-run. A small β means that externalities
are not large enough, then decisions will not be interdependent. If γ is small, economies
adjust slowly and history is always decisive.
We would like to study the distribution of manufacturing ﬁrms between the two regions.
In this model, the equilibrium is deﬁned by equations (15), (16), (17) and (19) together
with QMr = Lr with Q1 = Q2 = Q =
 ρL
M(1− (1−ρ)). Since E1 + E2 = E, and M1 + M2 =







, then M1 =
E1−φE2
(1−φ)E M and M2 =
E2−φE1
(1−φ)E M.
Consequently, our analysis has the same three types of equilibria as FT. However we
cannot disentangle the relationship between transportation costs and agglomeration once
we have opted for (19) to deﬁne regional expenditure.
Therefore, we have improved the dynamic analysis by modifying the migration law though
we cannot obtain clear results about manufacturing agglomeration. We shall try to im-
prove simultaneously both aspects in next section, modifying completely the theoretical
framework.
155 Changing functional forms
We apply the framework developed by Romer (1990) to an economy made of two regions.
There are two sectors in each region: the ﬁnal good sector and the R&D sector. R&D
produces patents for intermediate goods and develops these goods. Then, all interme-
diate goods are employed in the production of the ﬁnal good. All individuals earn the
same salary in the region, independently of the sector they work in. It is assumed that
population is constant. Even if all individuals in the same region earn the same salary, we
decide to restrict migration only to individuals in the R&D sector to keep comparability
with FT.









where the subscript makes reference to the region. Ai is the technology coeﬃcient in
region i, α satisﬁes that 0 < α < 1, Li is labor in the ﬁnal good sector, xi,j is the quantity
of intermediate good j used in the production of the ﬁnal good in region i. Finally, N is














where wi is the salary in region i and pj the price of intermediate good j. Taking the
ﬁrst order conditions we obtain the optimal salary and the optimal quantity of each
intermediate good:














Intermediate good j has price pj and to produce it, there is a cost equal to one. Total













2We change FT’s speciﬁcation for the production of the ﬁnal good. Keeping their speciﬁcation would
imply a unit salary in both regions and therefore there wouldn’t exist any incentive to migrate.
16where Υ accounts for transportation costs of the iceberg type and Υ > 1. Similarly, total














The R&D ﬁrm that retains the monopoly power over the patent it invents, maximizes the
proﬁt function (pj −1)Xj at each period. Taking the ﬁrst order conditions we obtain the
optimal value for the intermediate good price, pj = 1
α.
Let us assume that all intermediate goods are available in both regions. Since all inter-
mediate goods have the same price, the ﬁnal good ﬁrm uses the same quantity of the
intermediate goods coming from one region. Nevertheless, regions use more important
quantities of the goods produced at home since they do not incur in a transportation
cost3.
Consumers spend all their revenue in the ﬁnal good, which is unique though produced in
two diﬀerent regions. Then the ﬁnal good market clears when
Y1 + Y2 = (L1 + λ1)w1 + (L2 + λ2)w2 = l1w1 + l2w2, (26)
where li is total population in region i, for i = 1,2.
In Romer (1990) the cost of a new idea is proportional to the number of existing ideas,
namely wr
ηr
Nr+θsNs with ηr the ﬁxed cost of R&D in units of goods, θr the knowledge
spill-over from region r to region s and Nr the number of patents developed in region r.









pr is the price of an intermediate good developed in region r and ¯ r(v,t) is the average





































3Consequently, regional ﬁnal goods could be considered heterogenous since they are produced following
diﬀerent procedures. Nevertheless, we do not consider this alternative and we assume that ﬁnal goods
are homogenous for the sake of simplicity.
17For computational reasons, it is convenient to assume that θr = Υ
−α
1−α, for r = 1,2. This
implies that spillovers are identical from both regions.
Since migration is not allowed for individuals in the M sector, L1 and L2 are constant.






































































































for i = 1,2 with i  = j and where λi is the number of workers in the R&D sector in region
i.
Consumers are endowed with a ﬁxed quantity of labor that they supply inelastically. They
receive the wage rate w on their ﬁxed supply of labor. At t = 0 they own the existing
durable-good producing ﬁrms, and they earn the rate of return r on these assets. If we











subject to their budget constraint:
˙ a(t) = ra(t) + w(t) − c(t), (33)
18where c(t) is the quantity of consumption at time t. Solving this optimal control problem






(r − γ), (34)
and a transversality condition for c, limt→∞ u′(c(t))e−ρt = 0.
The budget constraint (33) expresses the ﬁnancial restrictions faced at one point in time
by a consumer, who maximizes her lifetime utility. In FT, individuals maximize their
lifetime utility, net of migration costs, subject to their lifetime budget constraint (6).
5.1 Equilibrium
Total population is constant. L1, L2 workers in the ﬁnal good sector are ﬁxed and λ1+λ2 =
























































































Modelling migration as in Krugman (1991) enables us to study the dynamic properties of
the model. In this model agents compare the discounted logarithm of salaries as a utility
measure4 instead of comparing the values of salaries. If q stands for the “shadow price of
the asset of having a unit of labor” in region 1 rather than in region 2, then
˙ λ1(t) = δ




















we can rewrite (40) as the following dynamic system,
˙ λ1(t) = δq(t), (42)






where λ1(0) is known and limt→∞ q(t) = 0. Notice that ˙ λ2(t) = −˙ λ1(t). We can rewrite
(43) as:



























5.3 Steady State and dynamics
We assume that once the economy reqches a steady state, N1 and N2 grow at constant





















where z is deﬁned as z =
N1
N2.
4FT proceed likewise in the last step of their analysis.
20If λ reaches a steady state, we can conclude that if g1 and g2 are constant in the long-run












We can rewrite (44) as



























The economy dynamics are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 [The Economy Dynamics]
Given the initial conditions {λ1(0),N1(0),N2(0)} and a terminal condition for q, limt→∞ q(t) =
0, the economy dynamics are described by the following three dimensional system:

     
     
˙ λ1(t) = δq(t),

























˙ z = λz+Υ
−α
1−α







A2} ≥ Υ−α, the economy possesses a unique interior steady state:

      





































Proof: Substituting ˙ λ1(t) = 0, ˙ q(t) = 0 and q(t) = 0 into (47), we obtain the values for
the steady state.
Although we have obtained a dynamical system that describes the evolution of the model
and its possible long-term conﬁguration, we cannot analyse its stability properties. Be-
sides, to ensure feasibility, we need min{
A1
A2} ≥ Υ−α to have ¯ z ≥ 0. Otherwise, the steady
state would not be feasible. In other words, we need our regions to be close technologi-
cally speaking in order to obtain a steady state, otherwise we cannot obtain any long-term
distribution.
Following Picard and Toulemonde (2003), we provide the deﬁnition of a stable equilibrium:
21Deﬁnition 3 [Stable equilibrium]
An equilibrium {¯ λ, ¯ N1, ¯ N2} is stable if, in the neighborhood of ¯ λ no locational deviation
by a group of individuals is proﬁtable.
Applying the above deﬁnition of stability one can analyze the stability of two speciﬁc
solutions, the corner solutions where all skilled individuals rest in one of the regions:
Proposition 4 [Stability of the corner solutions]
The two corner solutions deﬁned by ¯ λ1 = 0 et ¯ λ1 = 1 are stable solutions of (47).
Proof: See the appendix.
Without making further assumptions, proposition 4 is the unique analitical result we can
obtain, that is, we cannot study the interior steady state. In the next subsections we
make some simpliﬁcations regarding regional technologies in order to further analyse the
stability of the interior steady state.
5.3.1 Both regions use the same technology: A1 = A2
If both regions used the same technology in the ﬁnal good production, then the number
of patents that the two regions can develop is equal. This does not necessarily imply
that the number of researchers must also be equal, since ﬁxed costs could reduce one
region’s productivity. Therefore, if ﬁxed costs are larger in one region than in another,
more researchers would be needed to produce the same quantity of patents.
Proposition 5 [Stability analysis]
Under the assumption A1 = A2, the dynamic system (47) has a unique (saddle path)
steady state described by ¯ λ =
η1
η1+η2, ¯ q = 0 and ¯ z = 1.
Proof: See appendix 9.
In contrast with the two previous models, the present model has, technically speaking, a
classical structure with a unique steady state, one forward and two backward variables
which allows for a saddle-path. The multiple long-run solutions obtained in section 4 have
been transformed into a unique steady state uniquely determined by initial endowments.
The most remarkable diﬀerence between FT and this model lies in the production of
new patents in the R&D sector. Notice that the number of researchers is the externality
22itself in FT whereas for Romer, researchers is an input for ideas production but it is not
the productive externality. In this case, the externality comes from the accumulation of
ideas, which is a backward variable of the model. Hence, the externality within the Romer
economic structure is not strong enough to cause multiple equilibria.
We have ran numerical simulations to illustrate the stable arm of (47) applying the al-
gorithm developed by Brunner and Strulik (2002). This algorithm is based on backward
integration, which transforms an unstable forward looking system into a stable backward
looking system and exploits this characteristic. Besides, the approximation of the inﬁnite
time horizon is endogenously determined (see appendix 11 for details).
Figure 1 shows that along the direction of the eigenvector associated to the negative




















0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00
Lambda
Z
Figure 1: Stable manifold, A1 = A2
5.3.2 Regions use diﬀerent technologies: A1  = A2
When A1  = A2, the characteristic polynomial is of third degree with real non-integer coef-
ﬁcients. Therefore, we use a numerical resolution to obtain the roots of the characteristic
23polynomial to infer the dynamic properties of the model. The baseline scenario coincides
with that presented on Table 1, with A1 = 10 and A2 = 9.999.
Under these parameter values, the economy diverges from the its steady state since the
three roots of the characteristic polynomial are l1 = −0.935, l2,3 = 0.016 ± 0.04i. We
have considered several alternatives scenarios where we have modiﬁed the values of all
parameters over a feasible range. The long-run characteristics of the system seem sensible
only to parameter Υ. In eﬀect, when Υ → 1 we obtain a positive, a negative and a zero
eigenvalue. In this case, there exists a set of initial conditions that ensure convergence to
the steady state.
We would like to illustrate the model’s dynamical behavior by means of numerical simu-
lations. We set the same parameter values as in Table 1 but we set Υ = 1.005 to ensure
the existence of a convergent path, that is of a positive, a negative and a zero eigenvalue.
The steady state is {¯ λ = 0.48; ¯ q = 0; ¯ z = 1}. We choose λ(0) = 0.1¯ λ to compute
the increasing arm of the manifold and λ(0) = 2¯ λ for the decreasing arm. The stable
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Figure 2: Stable manifold, A1  = A2
We have studied the behavior of the system when Υ and η1 receive shocks. If the shock
is temporary, the manifold does not lose its stability and the trajectory is modiﬁed only
temporary. If the shock is permanent and agents anticipate it, the solution path shifts
though it converges to the new interior steady state.
246 Conclusion
We have presented three frameworks that model inter-regional migrations. The ﬁrst
model, introduced by Fujita and Thisse (2002) is very complex. As a result a standard
dynamic analysis is impossible. Since we ﬁnd this framework potentially rich, we simplify
the migration law and remove the mc-hypothesis. Having introduced these changes, we
analyze the model’s dynamics that are in the same line as FT’s results.
Section 5 proposes a version of Romer (1990) applied to an economy with two regions
and where workers are allowed to migrate. The steady state is unique and it depends on
several regional parameters as ﬁxed costs, technology but also on transportation costs. We
have proved that there exists a set of initial conditions along the direction of the stable
manifold for which the solution converges to the steady state. Moreover, the dynamic
behavior of the model is determined by history.
While FT model is more complex and throughout, it introduces several analytical prob-
lems, which cannot be solved by merely changing the migration law. The model presented
in section 5 proposes a standard multi-sectorial approach to model inter-regional migra-
tions and it studies its consequences on economic growth.
257 Appendix: Standard approach to solve FT’s dy-
namics




























taking its ﬁrst derivative:















0 γ ˙ λ1(s)(aH + W(0,s))I˙ λ1(s)>0ds +
  T
t γ(−˙ λ1(s))(aH + W(0,s))I˙ λ1(s)<0ds+





0 γ ˙ λ2(s)(aH + W(0,s))I˙ λ2(s)>0ds +
  T
t γ(−˙ λ2(s))(aH + W(0,s))I˙ λ2(s)<0ds+
+λ2(0)γ (aH + W(T)),
we have that
















which was expected since E1 + E2 = E is constant. Notice that we still have an integral term
in the derivatives of regional expenditure: aH + W(0,t). Let us recall that

























Then, if we call Λ(t) = aH + W(0,t), we have that













t (γ+g(λ(s)))dsdτ. The ﬁrst questions are whether it is growing inﬁnitely or whether
on the contrary, it reaches a steady state. To study these questions, let us compute its ﬁrst
derivative:
˙ Ω(t) = ((γ + g(λ(t)))Ω(t) − 1.
If λ(t) reaches a steady state, then Ω(t) = 1
γ+g(λ), which is constant. Nevertheless, we are not
yet sure about the long-run behavior of Λ.
Then, we can build a dynamic system made of the following equations:

           
           



































˙ Λ(t) = e−γt  E
σ (k2(λ) − k1(λ))Ω(t),
˙ Ω(t) = ((γ + g(λ(t)))Ω(t) − 1.
(49)
or using that E = E1 + E2:

        
        
























˙ Λ(t) = e−γt  E
σ (k2(λ) − k1(λ))Ω(t),
˙ Ω(t) = ((γ + g(λ(t)))Ω(t) − 1.
(50)
We know the initial conditions for λ, E1 and E2: {λ(0),E1(0),E2(0)}. It is more diﬃcult to
decide which kind of condition we have for Λ. Notice that at time t = 0, the future values of
this variable are unknown, which implies that both Λ(0) and Λ(T) are unknown. We cannot
give an initial nor a ﬁnal condition for Λ. Hence, the system is not well deﬁned and we cannot
run any numerical exercise.
27Besides notice that if the economy reached a steady state at t = T, then we could write ˙ Λ after
T as








Which is not constant. It is true that limt→∞ ˙ Λ(t) = 0, except if λ(t) = 1/2, ∀t ≥ 0.
As a conclusion from this discussion, if λ(t) = 1/2 ∀t, then the system would always be at steady
state. If not, all variables but Λ could reach a steady state value in ﬁnite time, but Λ would
continue growing (if k2(λ)−k1(λ) > 0, decreasing otherwise). Furthermore, we cannot compute
an initial nor a ﬁnal condition for Λ and Λ’s growth of rate is not constant, which impedes a
standard dynamic analysis.
Next, we need to verify the nature of the steady state if the relationship between E1/E2 and φ,
1/φ was diﬀerent, that is if we were at another equilibrium.
If E1/E2 ≥ 1/φ, then M1 = M and M2 = 0. Then, using (8), we have that P2/P1 = (1/φ)
1
σ−1.




















As in the equilibrium where 1/φ < E1/E2 < φ, ˙ λ(T) = 0 by construction. However, what is
new now is that this problem does not have λ = 1/2 as a steady state. It may have other values
but they are not trivial to ﬁnd. Then, we conclude as in the previous analysis, that the long-run
value for λ is not determined. We face the same problems as before when trying to analyze the
steady state properties or long-run properties of the dynamical system.
8 Appendix: Computation of the Jacobian of the dy-
namic system obtained in section 4.1








2(λ)) γ k1(λ) − k2(λ)
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28Computing |J(λ,q,V ) − lI| = 0, we obtain the values of the three eigenvalues of the system:







9 Appendix: Inter-regional migration within a Romer
structure. The Jacobian of the dynamic system.























If we develop |J − l I| = 0, we obtain that the system eigenvalues are: l1 = 0, l2 = γ,
l3 = λ
η1 − (1 − λ)1+2θ2
η2 . To obtain the values for the eigenvalues exposed in the proposition, we
only need to substitute λ by its value in equation (48).
10 Appendix: Stability of the corner solutions
If ¯ λ < λ(t) < 1, then ¯ λ = 1 would be stable if and only if ˙ λ(t) > 0. ˙ λ(t) > 0 if and only if q > 0.
Using the deﬁnition of q in (41), a necessary condition for q > 0 is that w1 > w2. w1 > w2 if
and only if z > ¯ z. Hence, ˙ λ(t) > 0 if and only if z > ¯ z. Using the deﬁnition of ˙ z, we obtain that
˙ z > 0 if and only if ¯ λ < λ(t).
Summarizing, if ¯ λ < λ(t) < 1 then ˙ z > 0 and z > ¯ z. This in turn implies that ˙ labmda > 0 which
proves that ¯ λ = 1 is stable. It can be proved, following the same reasoning as above, that ¯ λ = 0
is also a stable corner solution.
11 Appendix: Backward integration algorithm by Brun-
ner and Strulik (2002).
Let us assume that the original system is
d
dt
(x(t),y(t))T = F(x(t),y(t)) (51)
29with x ∈ Rl, y ∈ Rm and the initial value of y, y(0) is known. Besides, (51) with the initial




where (x∗,y∗)T is the steady state of (51). Furthermore, the system made of (51) together with
the initial condition for y and the boundary condition has a unique solution. Therefore, the
value of x(0) is unknown though determined by the other elements of the system.
The idea of backward integration is to obtain the solution of a dynamical system starting from
a value close to the steady state towards the initial condition. That is, time is reversed by the
following change of variable ˜ t = −t. If the dynamics of the original model were deﬁned by (51),
then after the change of variable, they become
d
dt
(x(−˜ t),y(−˜ t))T = −F(x(−˜ t),y(−˜ t)). (52)
Let us denote ˜ x =: x(−˜ t). Multiplying by −1 converts the stable manifold of (51) into an
unstable manifold of (52) and viceversa. The unstable manifold
Vu = {(x(t),y(t))T/ lim
t→−∞
(x(t),y(t))T = (x∗,y∗)T}
of (52) is the stable manifold of (51). Since Vu contains the convergent solution to (51), we can
choose an initial value
(x(0),y(0))T ∈ Vu (53)
close to the steady state (x∗,y∗)T. This forces the solution of (52) to take the same trajectory
as the solution of (51) but in reversed direction, and it takes the value y0 for tN > 0.
One important feature of the algorithm is that it uses the fact that trajectories are equivalent
if the solution to (51) is truncated at time tN, which is endogenously determined.
Starting from (53) we need to choose a direction of departure from the steady state. This method
proposed to compute the Jacobian of (51) evaluated at the steady state and the associated set
of eigenvalues. Since y is of dimension l, we must obtain at least l negative eigenvalues. The
associated eigenvectors generate a tangential subspace to Vu. If l = 1, then the starting point
would be
(˜ x, ˜ y)T = (x∗,y∗)T + ǫv1,
where v1 is the eigenvector associated to the negative eigenvalue. If l = 2, they propose:
(˜ x, ˜ y)T = (x∗,y∗)T + ǫv1 sinθ + ǫv2 cosθ,
30with θ ∈ [0,2π) and ǫ ∈ R.
To summarize the algorithm, we can describe it in three steps:
Step 1: Enter −F and the starting value.
Step 2: Enter y(0) as a stopping criterion. Then for one n ∈ N, yn ≈ y(0). We must introduce a
maximum error of discretization.
Then, we run the backward integration program. If the sequence does not approach y(0),
introduce a new starting value and run the backward integration program again.
The solution is a three-upla (˜ xi, ˜ yi,˜ ti)n
i=1 which is the numerical solution of (52) and n is
its length.
Step 3: We need to arrange the solution ot be a forward solution to 51:
xi = ˜ xn−i+1,
yi = ˜ yn−i+1,
ti = ˜ tn − ˜ tn−i+1,
for i = 1,...,n.
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